Introduction
Electronic institutions, such as auctions and market places are electronic counterparts of institutions that are established in our societies. They are established to regulate interactions between parties that are performing some transaction (see [7] for more details on the roles of institutions). Interactions are regulated by incorporating a number of norms in the institution which indicate the type of behavior each of the parties in the transaction should adhere to within that institution. The main concern of this work is to investigate what formal relation could be specified which accounts for how (abstract) norms can be incorporated in the (concrete) procedures constituting the institution, in such a way that agents operating within the institution either operate in accordance with those norms, or may be punished as they violate them.
That this relation is more complicated than just adding some constraints on the actions in the institution can be seen from the following example. The norm "it is forbidden to discriminate on the basis of age" can be formalized in deontic logic as "F(discriminate(x,y,age))" (stating that it is forbidden to discriminate between x and y on the basis of age). The translation of this formula would get down to something like that the action "discriminate(x,y,age)" should not occur. However, it is very unlikely that the agents operating within the institution will explicitly have such an action available. The action actually states something far more abstract. We claim that the level on which the norms are specified is more abstract and/or general than the level on which the processes and structure of the institution are specified. From an institutional standpoint norms need, in order to be incorporated in the institution itself, to be therefore "translated" to a level in which their impact on the institution can be described directly. A formal account of these "translation rules" constitutes the central aim of this work.
This abstract is organized as follows. In Section 2 we make the problem we are focusing on concrete by means of two examples; in Section 3 we expose our ideas about the connection among abstract and concrete normative specifications; in Section 4 we provide a sketch of the logical framework we developed to cope with the aspects we have been stressing in the previous sections; and in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
Abstract norms and concrete norms
The issuing of norms, as it appears in various statutes or regulations specifying constraints over institutions, has the characteristic of stating norms in such a form that allows them to regulate a wide range of situations and to be stable for a long period of time. The vaguer or abstract norms are, the easier it becomes to keep them stable. The downside of this stability is that normative specifications seem to be less well defined. In law it is even an explicit task of the judges to interpret the law for specific situations and determine whether someone violated it or not.
It is our thesis that abstract and concrete notions are described within different ontologies. Concrete norms are described in terms of the concepts that are used to specify (possible) procedural descriptions of the concrete institutions 1 . Abstract levels are instead described using a more general ontology.
In order to precisely illustrate the problem we are concerned with, we discuss two examples 2 . The first one is taken from Dutch regulation about personal data treatment within police registers ( [17] ). In the mentioned regulation the following norm is stated: "the inclusion of personal data in a severe criminality register occurs only when it concerns: a) suspect of crimes; b) etc." (Article 13a). This norm states that, under certain conditions, personal data may be included in a specific kind of police register. Suppose now that an electronic institution for that register has to be built which fully complies with the norms regulating the use of that register ( [2] ). The following question comes naturally about: "what can be concretely included in the register", that is "what is classified to be "personal data" in the context of [17] "? That this is more than just a definitional issue can be seen from the fact that more data that can be included from suspects than from persons related to the suspects. Also in special circumstances more data can be included. These things are defined in the model regulations on police registers ( [11] ). The second example is instead taken from Spanish regulation on organ transplantation ([9]): "a living donor must consent before a transplantation may take place" (Article 9). An analogous question can be raised: "what is understood as "consent" in the context of [9] "? This example shows that abstraction takes place over both over data (first example) as well as over actions. The consent action can be implemented by signing form 32 within the context of the transplantation in Spain. However, this way of implementing consent is only "valid" within that context.
On what basis are we entitled to consider the above translations as complying with the abstract ones? Signing a form seems a reasonable implementation of giving consent, whereas we would probably not accept wearing a red hat as a way of implementing consent. What does the connection between abstract and concrete normative specifications consist of, from a formal point of view? This is the central question we are here addressing.
Connecting abstract and concrete normative specifications
The model regulation on severe criminality registers ( [11] ) is explicitly conceived to lead to an application of the law in the context of the usage of severe criminality registers. The following norm is stated: "[In a severe criminality register] the following kinds of data can at most be included: financial and corporate data; data concerning nationality; etc." (Article 6). Basically, this article provides the list of data that it is allowed to include in the register, and it therefore consists in a concrete version of Article 13a cited in Section 2. Such a "translation", as we called it, is possible because an interpretation of the notion of personal data occurring in Article 13a, is somehow presupposed: "personal data are financial and corporate data; data concerning nationality; etc.". This rule, defining the notion of personal data within the context of the usage of severe criminality registers, states that if something is a datum concerning the nationality of, for instance, a suspect, then this datum is a personal datum and it can therefore be legally included in the register. We claim these rules 3 to constitute the connection between abstract and concrete norms.
In this example, being a personal datum is an abstract fact exactly because something can be a personal datum in many ways, depending on the context: in the context of the regulation of severe criminality registers, data as specified in Article 6 count as personal data, but within a different context, for example in the regulation about so called provisional police registers, something else can count as a personal datum. Abstract constraints are stable and hold for many situations because they are made concrete in several, possibly different, ways. The contextual nature of these translation rules led us to the logical framework sketched in Section 4.
To understand this contextual nature of institutions it seems useful to see them as regulating facts that hold on specific levels of abstractness: concrete levels are the levels on which facts hold that can be directly handled by the procedures an institution is organized through (something is a datum concerning nationality); abstract levels are the levels on which more abstract facts hold (something is a personal datum), and to which many more concrete levels can be see to converge via translation rules. We therefore understand institutions as sets of norms and translation rules which regulate facts holding on levels of abstractness 4 . Such a perspective also shows how more particular institutions, such as the ones operating severe criminality registers, are nested in more general ones, such as the one regulating the use of police registers in general. This nesting takes place through the abstractness layering. Picture 1 provides a graphical account of the intuitions just exposed.
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Analogous considerations may be carried out in relation with the second example mentioned in Section 2.
Sketch of the logical framework
To provide a formal theory of the intuitions exposed so far we propose to use a normal default logic ( [3] ) built on an underlying multi modal logic. This multi modal logic extends standard deontic logic (SDL) ( [10] ) with a propositional logic of contexts (PLC) with flatness property, outermost context and total truth assignments ( [4, 5] ).
This framework enables the following features.
-A formalization of the notion of level of abstractness as introduced in Section 3 is provided: i A and j A, with i < j (level i is strictly less abstract than level j according to partial order <), means that B is a more abstract state of affairs than A. This formalism provides us with the necessary expressive power to represent examples such as the ones exposed in sections 2 and 3 in conformity with our intuitions. Being based on normal default logic, and therefore coping with normative defeasibility 6 , it is moreover embeddable in argumentation frameworks ( [14] ) devised to mimic legal reasoning such as [15, 13] , thus enabling the possibility to deal with articulate reasoning patterns. This makes the framework, in our view, suitable to constitute a valuable basis for reasoning with institutions.
Before getting to the conclusive section we show how one of the reported examples might be represented in this logic. 
c P include(datum) Part of the concrete norm "personal data are financial and corporate data; data concerning nationality; etc." might be represented as follows:
c P include(datum) The translation rule "personal data are financial and corporate data; data concerning nationality; etc." is representable as follows:
The first norm is more abstract because it operates between level a and level c. The second one is instead more concrete. The connection among the two of them is expressed by the translation rule connecting c to a with respect to the states of affairs nationality(datum) and personal(datum) 7 . It may be worth noticing a reasoning pattern straightforwardly available on the basis of this representation: assuming c (nationality(datum) ∧ suspect(datum)), by means of default c nationality(datum) a personal(datum) and validities for , we can infer a personal(datum) ∧ suspect(datum)); we can then infer the normative consequence c P include(datum) by means of default a (personal(datum) ∧ suspect(datum)) c P include(datum) 8 .
5
Arrow is a shorthand for the normal default rules
A:B B
: if A and to infer B does not cause an inconsistency, then infer B. 6 Defeasibility of normative reasoning is one of the most investigated issues in the field of AI and Law researches (see for example [13] ) 7 Notice that we presupposed the state of affairs include(datum) to be a concrete one. 8 Notice that this argument is nothing but a normal defaults proof.
Conclusions
In this abstract we have discussed the problem of incorporating abstract norms into institutions that regulate the interactions between agents. We have shown that the level of abstraction of the norms is different from that of the specification of the procedures specified within organizations. Therefore, it does not suffice to just formalize the norms and procedures and validate/verify the procedures against the norms. We propose to use explicit translation rules (formalized by defaults) corresponding to the so-called constitutive rules in law to formalize this translation. Because the translation from the abstract level to the concrete level is strongly context dependent we also proposed to embed the formalizations of the rules in contexts and let the translations be a kind of bridge rules between these contexts. Although the logical formalism proposed gives the tools to describe the relations between norms on different abstraction levels and between norms and procedures it does not (in itself) account for the restrictions that apply to the translations ("wearing a red hat" is (probably) not acceptable as an implementation of "consent"). We intend to use formal ontological descriptions to provide this kind of restrictions.
